Short and Sharp - Basic Beliefs

In the essay ‘Is Belief in God Properly Basic?’ Alvin Plantinga argues that belief in God does not require evidential proof, as it is a properly basic belief (1). By this, he means it is a belief that cannot be based on any other belief. Another example of a basic belief is our memory; the belief that I have a memory cannot be based on any other belief; it is properly basic. Plantinga contends that belief in God is the same.

It should be noted that I agree with Plantinga’s foundationalism approach to epistemology; in that, I think that every belief we have can be boiled down to basic beliefs, which are self-evident and therefore do not require proof. For me, these basic beliefs are our senses, emotions, thoughts and memory (henceforth referred to as experiences). This is different from saying that our beliefs about our experience are properly basic; just that the experiences themselves are properly basic. This is known as basic empiricism and is discussed by Richard Carrier in his book ‘Sense and Goodness Without God: A Defence of Metaphysical Naturalism’ (2) or in this web article (3).

This is an important distinction to make as I believe this is primarily where Plantinga’s argument for God as a properly basic belief fails. There is a difference between experience and our interpretation of experience. Think acknowledging that you are having an experience compared to what that experience actually means. The first is undisputable; the second is quite easily disputable. To show the difference further, here are the examples that Plantinga uses to demonstrate basic beliefs:

1. I see a tree.
2. I had breakfast this morning.
3. That person is angry.

The problem is that none of these are basic beliefs; they are interpretations of experiences and, therefore, can be wrong. The tree could be a realistic fake; you could have dreamed you had breakfast this morning and mistaken it for reality; you could not understand how that person displays anger. If you construct a foundationalist epistemology that is based off incorrect basic beliefs, you’re going to be wrong a lot of the time (even by the standards of your own epistemology). 

References

1. Cottingham J. Western Philosophy: An Anthology. 2nd ed. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Pub.; 2008. (Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies).

2. Carrier R. Sense & Goodness Without God: A Defence of Metaphysical Naturalism. Bloomington, Indiana: AuthorHouse; 2005.

3.  Carrier R. Defending Naturalism as a Worldview: A Rebuttal to Michael Rea's World Without Design; 2003 [27/03/2011]; Available from: http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/rea.html.

Biological Immortality

In the February 2^nd, 2010 Deakin Philosophical Society meeting, we discussed the idea that humans may one day no longer age (after watching a TED lecture on the subject by Aubrey de Grey, which can be found here). In the discussion the followed, there seemed to be a disagreement which, in my opinion, hinged on a fundamental misunderstanding on how each party in the discussion was defining the term ‘immortal’; one side (my side, for those of you playing at home) was using a more biological definition of immortality, the other was using what might be the more colloquial sense of the word (namely, never having to die).

My take on the word immortal (at least, my usage of in during this debate) was more in line with biological immortality. The basic, one sentence summary of this concept would be where the death rate of an organism is not affected by the age of the organism. With humans (and animals in general), once adulthood is reached, the probability of an individual dying in the following year increases (that is, the older you are, the more likely you are to die). This graph from the Australian Bureau of Statistics illustrates the idea nicely:

Biological immortality would be represented in a graph like this:

That is, once adulthood was reached, the death rate would remain static (more or less). This is not to say people would not die, just that there would be no correlation between age and death rate. There would still be a correlation between life style choices and death rate (i.e. if you drink and drive, you’d have a higher probability of dying than someone who didn’t drink drive).

In using ‘immortal’ in this sense, I believe it is perfectly acceptable to say that humans will one day become immortal.

It should be noted that there may still be an indirect correlation between age and death rate in a biologically immortal race; it is possible that life would become mind-numbingly boring after many hundreds or thousands of years. Thus, the older people get in a biologically immortal society, the more likely they are to choose death.

Being wrong for the right reasons

In a discussion recently with a fellow atheist, I was asked which of the two following options I would prefer; a world full of rational Christians/Muslims/Jews etc. or a world full of irrational atheists. After a brief moment of thought, I responded that I would prefer the rational religious to the irrational atheists. This perplexed my friend, who said that they would prefer the opposite. They couldn't seem to understand why, given that we are both atheists, would I choose a world where everyone is wrong (from our point of view). My response is the topic of this post.

I place a higher value on the method upon which people reach their conclusion (i.e. reason, logic, evidence etc.) rather than whether the conclusions they reach are correct (or whether they match my own conclusions). This is because, if someone is at least willing to base their views off the same method as mine (or society in general), we can actually have a valid discussion of the issue. A person who rejects reasoned argument and evidence as a source of truth can’t be reasoned with.

This brings us back to the original hypothetical; while the irrational atheists agree with a single conclusion I have drawn, the fact that they use an alternative method for deducing it (say blind faith; accepting a claim as true regardless of the evidence for or against it) means they are more likely to have false views in other areas (politics, science etc.). And being that the theists in this hypothetical are using reason and logic to come to their opinions, they are more likely to have better opinions in these areas. So I would much rather a world where people came to the wrong conclusion on the topic of whether a god exists or not, but were still using the preferable method of coming to other conclusions.

An analogy of what I mean can be found in mathematics classes; from my experience, teachers would give marks on tests if you used the right formulas, but made an error in calculation (and therefore had the wrong answer). Some teachers would even go so far as to not give full marks for a question if working was not shown, even with the right answer. This is pretty much exactly what I mean; it is better to use the right formula, make a mistake in calculation and come to the wrong answer than to use no formula at all and get the answer right by chance.

Intentional Utilitarianism - A New Approach?

For those of you who are unfamiliar with utilitarianism, it is a view of morality that holds that an action is right if it leads to an increase in wellbeing or, conversely, a decrease in suffering (Thiroux and Krasemann, 2009). Therefore, actions that are immoral are those that lead to a decrease in wellbeing or an increase in suffering. It is part of a much broader category of moral theories described as teleological or consequentialist; moral actions should be judged on their consequences (the other category being the deontological theories; moral actions should be judged by their adherence to rules i.e. the Ten Commandments).

One of the problems I have with utilitarianism (even though I describe myself as such) is that it seems to discount motivations that lead one to their actions. I’ll give an example of a scenario where this becomes an issue;

Scenario 1:

Adam is a 22 year old who, in a fit of rage, intentionally runs over his girlfriend Eve with his car and kills her.

Adam* is a 22 year old who, through a small mistake on his part, runs over his girlfriend Eve* with his car and kills her.

Under utilartarianism, both of these actions are equally immoral; they both lead to the same consequence of Eve being dead. Yet, most of us would agree that there is a difference between the two (that Adam* is not as immoral as Adam). While it might be possible that our moral intuition about this is wrong (and they really are equally immoral), I think this is an case where utilitarianism fails to accurately describe what is moral.

However, I believe there is a simple addendum that can be added to utiltarianism that rectifies this (and many other similar) problems; taking intentions into account. The way to do this, in my opinion, is to have a second set of consequences; the intended consequences. The intended consequences can be compared to the actual consequences to determine the morality of an action. For example, let us assign some values upon which to evaluate this previous scenario;

Eve/Eve*’s death = -1,000

Therefore;

Adam’s actual consequences = -1,000 (he caused Eve’s death)
Adam’s intended consequences = -1,000 (he intended to cause Eve’s death)
Adam’s average consequences = (-1,000 + -1000)/2 = -1,000

Adam*’s actual consequences = -1,000 (he caused Eve*’s death)
Adam*’s intended consequences = 0 (he intended no harm)
Adam*’s average consequences = (-1,000 + 0)/2 = -500

Therefore, we can say that Adam’s actions are more immoral than Adam*’s actions. It should be noted that while the numbers are just arbitarily assigned, the underlying principle still holds; if the intended consequences are moral or neutral, it lessens the immorality of the actual consequence. I’ll also now provide a example in the positive to show that it works both ways;

Scenario 2:

Gill Bates gives a billion dollars to charity to help those in need and gets a tax break unintentionally.

Gill Bates* gives a billion dollars to charity to for the expressed purpose of getting a tax break.

Again, conventional utiliartarianism would say both Gill Bates and Gill Bates* are equally moral; in both cases the charity gets a billion dollars and they both get a tax break. Yet, most of us would say that Gill Bates is more moral. The solution, again, is to take their intentions into consideration;

Giving a billion dollars tocharity = +500
A billionaire getting a tax break = -50 (that extra money he saved could have been better spent by the government/it is unlikely to increase his own well being).

Therefore;

Gill Bates’s actual consequences = +500 (he gave a billion dollars to charity) and -50 (he got a tax break) = +450
Gill Bates’s intended consequences = +500 (he intended to help those in need)
Gill Bates’s average consequences = (+450 + +500)/2 = +475

Gill Bates*’s actual consequences = +500 (he gave a billion dollars to charity) and -50 (he got a tax break) = +450
Gill Bates*’s intended consequences = -50 (he only intended to get the tax break)
Gill Bates*’s average consequences = (+450 + -50)/2 = +200

Again, it is not so much that the numbers I have used accurately reflect the proportional differences in the consequences, just that the underlying principle holds; intended consequences have some bearing on the morality of an action.

It should be noted that this is just a rough outline of my idea. I can see many potential problems that need to be sorted out. An example being is that, in my scenarios, I assumed that actual and intended consequences are equally important (i.e. 50:50). In my opinion, it would be closer to 75:25 (in that, actual consequences are more relevent in determining morality than intended consequences). Another example is that intentions have to be conveyed by the person and, therefore, a person could lie about their intentions to seem more moral than they are (i.e. Gill Bates* could lie and say that he was really doing it for charity, when his true intentions are simply for the tax break).

So that is my idea; feel free to rip it to shreds if you see any problems or offer any advice on improving it.

UPDATED (10/01/2010)

A fellow medical student (thanks Ben) has suggested to me a possible addition to this take on utilitarianism; taking potential consequences into account. This is most applicible to actions that do not always have consequences, such as driving while under the influence. I will again go through a scenario to demonstrate the two competing ideas (utilitarianism vs. Intentional utilitarianism);

Scenario 3:

Clyde drives his car sober, not causing any accidents.

Clyde* drives his car intoxicated, not causing any accidents.

Once more, utilitarianism would have us believe that these two actions are morally equivilant; they both do not cause any suffering. Yet, we would all recognise that driving while intoxicated is clearly immoral. This can be rectified by taking potential consequences into account;

Potential consequences of driving while intoxicated = -500
Potential consequences while driving sober = -10

Therefore;

Clyde’s actual consequences = 0 (he didn’t cause any suffering)
Clyde’s potential consequences = -10 (he drove while sober)
Clyde’s average consequences = (0 + -10)/2 = -5

Clyde*’s actual consequences = 0 (he didn’t cause any suffering)
Clyde*’s potential consequences = -1000 (he drove while intoxicated)
Clyde*’s average consequences = (0 + -500)/2 = -250

One might ask why I am giving a negative value to driving while sober; the reason is that even a perfectly lucid individual who follows the road rules to the letter could still be involved in an accident (i.e. a child running out in front of their car with little warning). Therefore, one accepts a certain level of potential consequences when one gets behind the wheel of a vehicle.

It should also be noted that the relationship between the potential consequences of driving sober and intoxicated is proportional; I am assuming that driving intoxicated increases one’s potential of causing suffering by a factor of a fifty. If, in reality, it only increases it by a factor of twenty, then the average would change accordingly.

A further point to take in is how I am defining the terms;

Potential consequences – The predicted consequences before an action is taken. For example, Russian Roulette with a six shooter, with death being a value of -1000, would have a potential consequences value of -166.66 (-1000/6).

Intended consequences – The hypothetical consequences if an action goes exactly as one intends (i.e. a perfect execution of the action).

It is possible to combine all three sets of consequences; actual, intended and potential. Also, to give a more accurate representation of the completed theory (which is long way off, assuming no one can point out any critical issues as it builds), I will proportion the consequences in a 3:2:1 ratio (i.e. actual consequences are 3, potential consequences are 2, and intended consequences are 1) To demonstrate an example of this, I will revise the intitial scenario;

Scenario 1 (revised):

Adam is a 22 year old who, in a fit of rage, intentionally runs over his girlfriend Eve with his car and kills her.

Adam* is a 22 year old who, through a small mistake on his part, runs over his girlfriend Eve* with his car and kills her.

Eve/Eve*’s death = -1,000
Potential consequences of intending to cause Eve/Eve*’s death = -950
Potential consequences of driving with no impairments = -10

Therefore;

Adam’s actual consequences = -1,000 (he caused Eve’s death)
Adam’s potential consequences = -950 (he intended to cause Eve’s death)
Adam’s intended consequences = -1,000 (he intended to cause Eve’s death)
Adam’s average consequences = ((-1,000 * 3) + (-950 * 2) + (-1000 * 1))/6 = -983.33

Adam*’s actual consequences = -1,000 (he caused Eve*’s death)
Adam*’s potential consequences = -10 (he was driving with no impairments)
Adam*’s intended consequences = 0 (he intended no harm)
Adam*’s average consequences = ((-1,000 * 3) + (-10 *2) + (0 * 1))/2 = -503.33

The reason I do not have the potential consequences of intending to cause Eve/Eve*’s death as the same as actually causing her death is that it is possible to fail; one could attempt to kill someone but not, therefore, due to that possibility, it is valued slightly less negatively.

Again, any criticism will be greatly appreciated.

UPDATED (13/01/2010)

It has been pointed out by Dylan that what I really mean by potential consequences is better described as a ‘recklessness index’; a measure of the risk assoicated with a particlar action leading to a particular outcome. I am choosing, however, to call it a ‘Risk Index’, as I believe this can be equally applied to both positive actions (like donating to charity) and negative actions (such as drink driving).

The Risk Index (RI) is based on another suggestion made by Dylan; Best Available Evidence (BAE). The BAE is the information an actor has available to them on how likely different outcomes are based on their actions prior to performing them (i.e. foresight). In my new equation (see below), I will express it as a percentage. So, to summarize;

The Risk Index (RI) is the percentage chance that an action will lead to an outcome based upon the actor’s Best Available Evidence (BAE). RI is not exactly the same as BAE; RI is what a normal, rational individual would judge to be the probability based on the BAE. This seperates the possibility of a person who has the available evidence to accurately determine the RI, yet does not due to a fault on their part that a normal, rational individual would not make (i.e. not understanding the evidence well enough).

Example: a person is aware that drink driving increases the risk of crashing by twenty times, yet believes the risk of them crashing is lower because they think they are a better than average driver. The RI this person would calculate for themselves drink driving is therefore wrong as the twenty times increase figure is based upon all other things being equal (i.e. any driver that is drunk is 20 times as likely to crash than if he was sober).

Also, upon review of the values I calculated in Scenario 1 and Scenario 1 (revised), I feel that the average consequences between the two individuals (Adam and Adam*) is too close, given their vast differences in moral responsiblity (intending to kill versus a simple mistake). As such, I am altering my equation to be as follows;

Consequences attributable to actor = ((2 * AC) + (1 * IC))/3 * RI

Where;

AC = Actual consequences
IC = Intended consequences
RI = Risk Index

Rather than revise the previous scenario, I will begin with two new examples, one negative and one positive;

Scenario 4:

John intentionally punches Jim in the face.
John*, due to waving his arms about, unintentionally punches Jim* in the face.

Where;

Jim/Jim* being punched in the face = -50
RI of attempting to punch someone = 95% (in this case, I am assuming that John has attempted his punch while Jim was not looking; therefore, if the scenario was different and John was aware that Jim were expecting the punch, the RI would be lower)
RI of waving arms about = 6%

Therefore;

John’s AC = -50 (he punched Jim in the face)
John’s IC = -50 (he intended to punch Jim in the face)
John’s RI = 95% (he attempted to punch Jim in the face)
Consequences attributable to John = ((2 * -50) + (1* -50))/3 * 95% = -47.5

John*’s AC = -50 (he punched Jim in the face)
John*’s IC = 0 (he didn’t intend to punch Jim in the face)
John*s RI = 6% (he was waving his arms)
Consequences attributable to John* = ((2 * -50) + (1 * 0))/3 * 6% = -2

And now for the positive example (negatives are so much simpler);

Scenario 5:

Jane gives $1000 to a well-established charity organisation, and the money is put to good use.
Jane* gives $1000 to a newly created charity organisation, and the money is put to good use.

NOTE: the two charity organisations share the exact same goal; therefore the only variable between them is the experience that each one of them has.

Where;

The charity effectively using the $1000 = +100
RI of giving to a reputable charity = 98% (in that, there is a small possibility that the money will be wasted)
RI of giving to a newly founded charity = 75% (there is a greater chance that this charity may be ineffective, as it has yet to demonstrate it is reliable)

Therefore;

Jane’s AC = +100 (her money was effectively used by the charity)
Jane’s IC = +100 (she intended her money to be used effectively)
RI = 98% (it is a reputable charity)
Consquences attributable to Jane = ((2 * +100) + (1* +100))/3 * 98% = 98

Jane*’s AC = +100 (her money was effectively used by the charity)
Jane*’s IC = +100 (she intended her money to be used effectively)
RI = 75% (it is new charity)
Consquences attributable to Jane* = ((2 * +100) + (1* +100))/3 * 75% = 75

The reasoning behind this is that, even though the money was effectively used by both charities, there was a greater risk in wasted money by donating to the new charity. This does not imply that donating to new charities is in any way immoral (it still has a positive figure), just that, given the potential risk associated with giving money to the new charity, it is slightly more moral to give it to the well established charity. This of course becomes null and void when the choice is between a new charity (75) and no charity at all (0).

I know I should like a broken record now but comment, criticise and otherwise make me your bitch (intellectually speaking, of course).

References:

THIROUX, J. & KRASEMANN, K. 2009. Ethics: Theory and Practise, Pearson International Education.

An Apology and an Update

It appears that I have fallen behind when it comes to maintaining this blog. This is not for lack of interest, mind you; I don’t like writing unless I am sure that what I am writing is worth reading (to someone at least) and have not been feeling that spark that I usually do. Fortunately, it appears to have returned, so I figured the first place to start is to review all the books I have read since my last review (which is a lot, so they will be short and to the point).

I have also created a ‘Top Ten Book' list and will update it when need be. This will save me from having to rank each new book I review in the review itself, thus allowing me to talk more about the book itself.

Also added is my 'Websites Worth Visiting' list; this is most comprised of blogs that I often read and find the topics discussed to be of a high intellectual standard. I shall add to it as I come across more sites worth visiting.

You may also notice that I have changed the format/design of my blog. Hope you don't mind the change.

Book Review - ‘You Can Lead an Atheist to Evidence, But You Can’t Make Him Think’ by Ray Comfort

This book stands out from others that I have read in that it is one that I purchased expressly knowing it had a premise that I disagreed with. If anyone is familiar with Comfort, they might accuse me of intentionally picking someone who has a weak counter-position to my own. This may be true, but I first wish to acclimate myself with the ‘every man’s’ argument for Christianity. To me, this should be the one worth listening to, especially if Christianity is meant to be a belief system for everyone, not just high-end theologians with weird esoteric views of what God is and wants.

Unfortunately, Comfort is more ‘preaching to the converted’. Many of his arguments require that you accept certain premises which he fails to prove or give valid reasons of why we might consider them. Another important point is that many of his analogies are painfully flawed. Not in the sense that the analogy doesn’t hold true when viewed in high detail (as all analogies break down when viewed under a microscope), but they often don’t even hold true on the most basic level. One of his favourite is the ‘creation is proof a creator’ argument, in which he uses the example of a painting; if you see a painting, you know there must be a painter because paintings don’t just create themselves. He then attempts to link this up to humans/the Earth/the universe; because these things exist, they must have a creator i.e. God. The problem is two-fold; firstly, we have no evidence of a natural process that can create a painting, but we have some evidence of natural processes that can create humans (evolution) and planets (stellar formation). The second problem is that he is jumping to his preconceived conclusion. The best we could say is that the universe had a cause, not that it had a creator. Using the term cause doesn’t rule out creator; it is just more inclusive of natural possibilities which we have yet to discover. Comfort instantly jumps from ‘cause’ to ‘Christian God’ (arguably because he was already at that point).

So, would I recommend this book to others? In a roundabout way, yes I would. Not because it contains any points of intellectual value (though it is a good mental exercise to see if you can see how he is wrong), but simply because it is an insight into how fundamentalists view the world.

1.5/10

Another Your Say Letter... This time about gay marriage!

If anyone can grab a hold of the 3rd of December, 2010 copy of the Geelong Advertiser, they can read the letter to which mine is responding to (entitled 'Same-sex marriage against beliefs'). For those of you that can't, the general tone of the letter is a 'the Bible says homosexuality is wrong, I believe the Bible, therefore I win' type argument. This I couldn't let slide. Here is my response:

"In responding to Dennis Irvine’s letter regarding gay marriage (3/12), it is hard to believe that a person could be so disconnected from the facts.

Firstly, a literal reading of the Biblical account of creation (i.e. Adam and Eve) has been disproven by science. The evidence shows that humans evolved from, and still are, animals.

This does not disprove God, of course. It merely disproves that the Bible has an accurate portrayal of the origins of humanity.

The second point worth mentioning would be that it appears that Mr. Irvine is being selective in what he takes from the Bible.

In the same book that prohibits homosexual interactions, it also prohibits trimming the sides of one’s beard.

I doubt Mr. Irvine would write such an impassioned objection to the ‘immorality of beard trimming’.

The more relevant correction would be that there is no evidence that raising children in a same-sex environment is detrimental to their development.

It appears that the more important factor is whether children are raised in a loving environment, regardless of the gender of the parents.

Finally, it should be noted also that our society is a secular one. As such, our laws must have a reason that is not specific to religion. The justification must be relevant to all individuals, be they religious or non-religious.

Secularity is the only way in which a society that is comprised of religious and non-religious individuals can interact without the oppression of one group or the other.

Therefore, if you wish to argue that the law should not recognize gay marriage, a secular justification needs to be provided, not one based on personal religious beliefs."

As always, if I get a response, I will post more details.